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INDICATIONS AND WARNING

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*Changed to reflect Lehman's view that indicators are less applicable to political warning*

☐ The goal of the Indications and Warning Mission, in its broadest interpretation, is to provide timely warning of events in foreign countries that might require action by our national leaders. Ultimately, events of greatest importance to the President and the NSC are those which portend a hostile nation's increased capability or intent to wage war against us or our allies, and, as a result, much of our I&W effort centers on improving our capability to perform this warning-of-war mission. Traditionally, the Community's approach <sup>for</sup> ~~to~~ providing warning-of-war is to identify anomalous activities (or indicators) which are precursors of military actions, and then continually monitor a potential enemy's activities to detect the indicators' occurrence. Although this approach seems to work well for military warning, application to political warning is more difficult. In the political arena, identification and monitoring of relevant indicators is complicated by the wide range of political events of potential interest and the difficulties encountered in rigorously structuring the analysis of <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ political and economic information available. Among his community responsibilities, the DCI assigns highest priority to improvements in I&W in general and political warning in particular--improvements that should be facilitated by a number of initiatives in ~~community~~ organization, collection, and production undertaken during the past year.

☐ Organizationally, the major I&W initiative in the past year was the DCI's recent establishment of a National Intelligence Officer for Warning (NIO/Warning) who will serve as his senior staff officer for all warning matters. The NIO/Warning will establish new national warning

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*Technicality -- Working Group does not get formally established*

procedures and will, on a continuing basis, ensure maximum sensitivity to the warning content of existing intelligence. On the policy and management side the NIO/Warning will chair the newly created interagency Working Group on Warning\*. Substantively, that is in deciding of what to warn, when to do it, and how, he will work through and direct the other NIOs. Among the NIO/Warning's present priorities are:

o overseeing the shakedown period of a new monthly cycle of NIO-Community consultations on warning, followed by NIOs' communications to the DCI describing which situations or trends in their various areas of responsibility warrant special attention in the ensuing one to three months. This process will place special emphasis on improving the warning discipline for political intelligence;

*Added*

o reviving or modifying as appropriate the Alert Memorandum as a key mechanism for conveying warning to senior consumers;

*Extracted from bullet at top of next page*

o rewriting the DCID related to the warning mission (1/5);

o developing close working relationships and mutual support understandings with the senior intelligence officers of the DoD commands;

\*Membership: DIA/Vice Director for Production; CIA/NFAC, Chief Requirements and Evaluation Staff; State/INR, Chief, Political/Military Affairs; NSA, Chief, "V" Group; Associate Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking. A representative of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is currently sitting in on the Working Group's initial definitional phase. Other participants may be included from time to time as the agenda indicates.

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- o procedurally, reviewing the mission and functions of the Strategic Warning Staff;

- o developing and implementing a strategy to respond to the National Intelligence Topic on warning: "How much warning of attack can the U.S. expect? To what extent are Soviet active and passive measures likely to degrade warning?"

25X1 [ ] A second organizational initiative which is directly relevant to I&W is the creation of a National Intelligence Tasking Officer (NITO) for Warning and Crisis Management within the newly created Collection Tasking Staff. The NITO for Warning will be collocated with the Collection Coordination Facility in the Pentagon and will have Community-wide responsibility for all aspects of I&W collection.

25X1 [ ] Other I&W initiatives in the past year range from the development of tools and procedures to facilitate the collection and extraction of warning information from current intelligence, to longer term production efforts aimed at providing a better understanding of the context in which events of interest are likely to occur. An example of a major effort specifically designed to improve both I&W collection and production is the ongoing WISP (Warning Improvement Study and Plan) project sponsored by DIA. Initiated in 1977 and conducted with Community-wide participation and DCI endorsement, the goals of WISP are to:

- o select, on an all-source basis, a set of intelligence targets to provide unambiguous and timely warning that the Soviet/Warsaw Pact Forces are developing the capability to launch an attack;

- o develop a strategy to guide the collection of information against the target set which best utilizes the capabilities of the relevant sensors;

- o develop automated procedures for processing and analyzing the collected information and the taking of reasoned and orderly action on the warning intelligence produced.

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☐ The target selection phase of WISP was completed this year and a pilot test of proposed collection, reporting, and processing procedures is currently underway. The test uses historical PHOTINT and SIGINT data collected on Soviet LRA and Naval activities during the Spring of 1975 to determine how well the "Readiness to Attack Temperature" predicted by the WISP model tracks with known conditions during the sample period. In addition, the test will help identify problems in collection or reporting that might develop if the WISP concept were employed under operational conditions.

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☐ Another initiative designed to improve I&W procedures and capabilities is the recent publication by DIA of a Concept Plan for upgrading and better integrating the Worldwide DoD I&W System. In conjunction with this effort a Policy Council was formed, chaired by DIA's Vice Director for Production with representatives from the four services and the eight Unified and Specified Commands. Thus far the council members have reached agreement on:

- o a common definition of the DoD I&W mission;
- o a hierarchical structure categorizing the roles of the 25 I&W centers which comprise the worldwide system;

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o a list of warning products that each of the centers will produce.

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☐ The next stage in the Upgrade Project is the development of a system implementation plan which will be more specific on what ADP, communications, and analyst training resources will be necessary to realize the upgrade goals. A newly formed, working-level Planning Group will meet to address these issues in early 1979, followed by the second semiannual Policy Council meeting in the Spring.

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☐ Of the more recent longer term production efforts relevant to I&W, two that are especially noteworthy examine our warning capabilities in Europe and Korea--areas of perennial warning-of-war interest. NIE 4-1-78, "Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Going to War in Europe: Implications for NATO Warning of War" was completed in March 1978 and concludes that under a wide range of likely scenarios the Community would be able to provide warning within one day of the Pact having initiated the process of placing its forces in a state of full combat readiness.

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☐ In the Korean theater, DIA is continuing the WINK (Warning in North Korea) analysis of our ability to provide warning in a likely, worst case scenario detailed in the 1977 report "A North Korean Attack (Pre H-Hour Scenario Study)." Current WINK efforts center on an in-depth assessment of data generated by collectors and I&W analysts who were asked to evaluate their capabilities against targets and indicators relevant to the postulated scenario. In addition to estimating the probability of being able to provide warning, the analysis is addressing such questions as: what collection targets are most lucrative, which

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indicators provide greatest analyst reaction, and what is the relative timeliness of different collection systems.

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Finally, examples of other prominent studies with I&W relevance that are either recently completed or currently underway include:

- o HPSCI: "Warning: An Assessment of Intelligence Community Performance and Capability"
- o IIM: "Warning of the Warsaw Pact Use of Chemical Weapons"
- o CIA: "Soviet Indications and Warning" (first in a series)
- o Resource Management Staff: "An Analysis of U.S. Indications and Warning Collection Capabilities in Europe"
- o Interagency Working Group: "A Survey of Warsaw Pact Intelligence Denial Capability"
- o NIE 11-10-78: "Soviet Military Capabilities to Project Power and Influence in Distant Areas"
- o NIE 11-14-78: "Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO"
- o NIE 11-3/8-78: "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict"
- o NIE 11-6-78: "Soviet Strategic Forces for Peripheral Attack"

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